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Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to environmentally friendly behaviour even in the 
absence of environmental policy. This paper looks at the interactions of social norms and 
environmental regulation in their impact on individual behaviour. People obtain social 
rewards for voluntary abatement efforts. These social rewards may be crowded out by 
environmental regulation taking the shape of standards or taxes. Moreover, the paper shows 
that environmental externalities and externalities related to social norms interact and that an 
optimal environmental policy should consider both types of externalities. From a general 
welfare point of view, emission taxes are superior to emission standards, but people 
responsive to social rewards prefer standards. 
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1.  Environmental Policy, Intrinsic Motivation, and Social Norms 
Most of the economic analysis of environmental problems and their solution is based 
on  a  rather  narrow  conception  of  man.  Humans  are  being  viewed  as  egocentric 
rational  utility  maximisers  who  respond  to  only  two  types  of  external  stimuli: 
economic  incentives  and  coercion.  The  environmental  policies  discussed  by 
economists  are  usually  directed  at  these  two  stimuli.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are 
emission  taxes,  abatement  subsidies,  and  tradable  pollution  permits,  that  provide 
economic incentives or disincentives. On the other hand, there is the command-and-
control approach, forcing individuals to do what they would not do voluntarily. A 
large  literature  in  the  field  of  environmental  economics  has  been  devoted  to 
comparing  the  incentives  and  the  command-and-control  approaches,  usually 
establishing  the  superiority  of  the  former  over  the  latter.  Other  determinants  of 
environmentally relevant behaviour, however, have been neglected by and large. This 
would  not  be  a  serious  omission  if  they  were  of  only  minor  relevance.  This  is, 
however,  not  the  case.  Environmentally  friendly  behaviour  is  often  observed  in 
situations where neither economic incentives nor coercion by law are present. An 
example is the separate collection of different types of household waste (organic, 
plastic, paper, bottle, batteries, etc.), in which many people engage although there are 
no economic incentives and no enforced laws. Still people incur private costs storing 
several types of waste separately in their homes and then bringing them to particular 
waste containers where these materials are collected for recycling purposes. There are 
two possible explanations for this type of behaviour: intrinsic motivation and social 
norms. Either people derive some extra utility from behaving in a way they consider 
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to be environmentally friendly or responsible, or they are driven by social norms and 
social control. This paper is about the second aspect.
 1 
  The neglect of intrinsic motivation and socially determined behaviour by main-
stream environmental economics could be justified if the economic and non-econ-
omic  spheres  were  independent  of  each other,  i.e. if the introduction of environ-
mental taxes, tradable permits, and other kinds of regulation did not affect intrinsic 
motivation and social norms. However, this often is not the case. It is well-known, 
for instance, that economic incentives interfere with intrinsic motivation. A famous 
example is the claim that economic incentives can erode the intrinsic motivation to 
donate blood. See Titmuss (1971), who argues that countries in which blood donation 
is  commercialised  suffer  from  larger  shortages  in  blood  supply  than  countries  in 
which  blood  is  donated  on  a  voluntary  basis.  Empirical  evidence  that  monetary 
incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation has been provided by Gneezy/Rustichini 
(2000a,b) and Brekke/Kverndokk/Nyborg (2003). Mellström/Johannesson (2005) did 
an experiment on the effect of economic incentives on blood donation and show that 
women  are  subject  to  crowding-out  effects,  whereas  men  are  not.  Weck-Hanne-
mann/Frey (1995) argued that the crowding out of intrinsic motivation might apply to 
environmentally responsible behaviour as well. Economic instruments of environ-
mental policy, in particular if they attach a price to environmental quality, may under-
mine  intrinsic  motivation.  The  main  reasons  are  that  external  coercion  and  price 
incentives erode self-determination and that they are often applied in a way perceived 
as being unfair by the regulatees.
2  
  Hirsch  (1976,  ch.  6)  has  argued  that  similar  arguments  apply  to  socially 
determined behaviour. The functioning of social interactions may be eroded by the 
introduction  of  markets.  This  has  been  formalised  by  Holländer  (1990),  Kandel/ 
Lazear (1992) and Bénabou/Tirole (2006). Experimental research has established that 
                                                            
1  Social  control  of  environmentally  relevant  behaviour  is  omnipresent  in  some  societies.  For 
example, Germany, and particularly Eastern Germany, is a country where the separation of house-
hold waste is taken very seriously by substantial parts of the population. Living there, the author of 
this paper has made his personal experiences with social control. Imagine a situation where you 
throw an empty wine bottle into the ordinary waste bin located in the backyard of the house you are 
living in. A window in the neighbouring five story house opens and a voice starts yelling at you 
telling you that you should get this bottle out of this waste bin and bring it to the glass container 
located  some  three  blocks  down  the  street.  Many  people  would  not  care  about  this,  but  as  a 
German, you start feeling guilty. Social control has worked. 
2  See Frey (1986, 1992, 1993) for a more general discussion of this idea. In Frey (1992), a simple 
formalisation of the phenomenon of intrinsic motivation is given in the framework of a utility 
maximisation model.  
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social  norms  and  social  rewards  really  play  an  important  role  in  the  creation  of 
cooperative outcomes in prisoners'-dilemma-type games. See Gächter/Fehr (1999), 
for example. Additional empirical evidence supporting the claim of crowding out of 
environmentally relevant social norms by economic incentives has been reported by 
Cardenas/Stranlund  (2000),  who  did  an  experiment  with  inhabitants  of  rural 
Columbia who relied on using forest resources. Their experiment consisted of two 
treatments, one with social interaction and the other one without social interaction, 
but with an environmental regulation (that was only weakly enforced). To me, this 
set-up seems a bit artificial since in the real world social norms and environmental 
regulation co-exist. This co-existence of norms and regulation will be modelled in 
this paper. The main questions to be answered by this paper are: 
·  Does environmental regulation crowd out social norms? 
·  Is there a difference between the effects of different types of environmental 
policy, in particular between market instruments and command and control? 
·  Can  stricter  environmental  regulation  be  harmful  to  the  environment  if 
crowding-out effects are very strong? 
·  What  are  the  rules  for  optimal  environmental  policies  if  social  norms  are 
relevant? 
The approach is a theoretical one. I modify Holländer's (1990) model of socially 
rewarded contributions to a public good and apply it to an environmental-economics 
setting. In contrast to Holländer, who endogenises the supply of social rewards, I 
assume that this supply is exogenously given. On the other hand, I will allow for a 
more general model of the impact of social rewards on individual behaviour, where 
Holländer  used  a  linear  specification.  Moreover,  in  my  model  agents  are  hetero-
geneous  whereas  they  were  homogenous  in  Holländer's  model.  Finally,  different 
instruments of environmental policy are analysed and it will be seen that instrument 
choice  matters.  Another  paper  closely  related  to  the  present  one  is  that  by 
Lai/Yang/Chang (2003), who look at a model where socially responsible firms decide 
to  comply  with  environmental  standards  even  though  the  probability  of  being 
detected and fined as a non-compliant is small. The strength of the social norm and, 
therefore, the severity of social sanctions depends positively on the number of firms 
not violating the standard.
3 As in other models of this type (e.g. tax evasion models), 
                                                            
3   In my view, there is logical problem here. Like legal sanctions, social sanctions require that a 
deviation from the norm is observable and verifiable, but in Lai/Yang/Chang (2003, p.66) social 
sanctions  are  independent  of  the  detection  of  any  violation  of  norms.  Their  approach  may, 
however, be saved by arguing that deviators do not suffer from social sanctions but from a negative  
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there are multiple equilibria with high and low degrees of compliance and the authors 
show that tighter environmental policies may increase pollution. The present paper is 
different from that by Lai/Yang/Chang (2003) in two major respects. Firstly, I do not 
consider illegal activities but concentrate on voluntary contributions. Agents do not 
only refrain from breaking the law; they really do more than they are required to do. 
Secondly, the number of voluntary contributors is exogenous. Another related paper 
is by Bénabou/Tirole (2006), who deal with social norms and social rewards as a 
signalling problem. People like to be regarded as being unselfish and prosocial, but 
fellow humans can only extract limited information about their true character from 
their behaviour. This implies that pooling takes place and that changes in economic 
environment  such  as  institutions  furthering  the  desired  behaviour  may  be 
counterproductive  since  they  attract  the  wrong  people  to  the  pool.  In  my  model, 
pooling plays no role: the action reveals the true character of the agent. Nevertheless, 
this paper derives some surprising results and interesting policy implications. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 establishes a simple model of socially 
rewarded environmental behaviour containing the elements just mentioned. Section 3 
studies  the  effects  of  changes  in  environmental  policy  on  this  behaviour.  In 
particular, I am interested in the crowding-out issue. In Section 4, optimal environ-
mental policies are analysed and the question is raised whether flexible instruments 
such as taxes are preferable to command and control. In Section 5, I look at results of 
majority voting. How do environmental policies chosen by diverse groups in society 
differ? Section 6 contains some final thoughts. 
  Before I start, a remark about the use of the term "voluntary abatement" needs to 
be made. I will use the notion of voluntary abatement to characterise that part of 
abatement effort which goes beyond the level required (or strived at) by environ-
mental  regulation.  For  instance  imagine  an  abatement  effort  A  enforced  via  an 
emission  tax  or  another  environmental-policy  instrument.  If  a  is  an  observed 
individual abatement level that eceeds A, I call a–A the voluntary abatement. Strictly 
speaking, this abatement is not purely voluntary. People acting "voluntarily" receive 
social rewards. Conceptually, social rewards and sanctions are not much different 
from the pecuniary incentives and disincentives created by market instruments of 
environmental  policy  or  from  legal  sanctions.  Nevertheless  I  will  use  the  term 
"voluntary abatement" to characterise the abatement going beyond what is required 
by the law. After this semantic remark, the analysis can begin.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
self image, which may indeed be socially influenced and, thus, may depend on the (observable) 
general level of compliance. This is closely related to the issue of moral motivation discussed in 
Brekke/Kverndokk/Nyborg (2003).   
 
5 
2. The Model 
Consider a society consisting of a large number of individuals and let population size 
be one. This society consists of two types of individuals. One type responds to social 
rewards and the other does not. It is plausible to argue that the latter group is to a 
large extent composed of competitive firms, which react to monetary incentives only. 
A  firm  spending  resources  on  activities  that  are  socially  beneficial  but  are  not 
rewarded by the market will not remain competitive and will be be driven out of the 
market.  Ethical  considerations  or  social  recognition  do  not play a role. See, e.g., 
Siebert (1992, 130) for this argument.
4 Ethical behaviour and voluntary contribution 
to public goods are feasible only for the non-competitive part of the economy and for 
agents involved in non-market activities, in particular private households. For the 
sake of brevity the two types will be referred to as "type S" for the people responding 
to social interactions and "type C" for the competitive part of the economy, which 
reacts to economic incentives and command-and-control only. Assume that S- and C-
type individuals are identical in all other respects and that shares of the two groups in 
the population, z and (1-z), are constant.
5  
  If  no  abatement  is  undertaken,  each  individual  discharges  E  into  the 
environment. Let A be the abatement level required by the environmental regulation. 
Individuals  not  responding  to  social  norms  discharge  E-A.  The  other  individuals 
abate a>A and a–A is is called voluntary abatement. Emission abatement is costly, 
the cost function c(A) being increasing and strictly convex: c'(.)>0 and c''(.)>0. Let T 
be the emission tax rate paid by type-C individuals. Then four kinds of environmental 
regulation can be distinguished: 
·  T=A=0:     laissez faire, i.e. no environmental regulation, 
                                                            
4   Non-profit motives can survive, however, if firms enjoy market power and appropriate rents that 
can  be  spent  on  socially  rewarded  activities  such  as  environmentally  friendly  production  or 
sponsorship of culture, science, and sports. In a changing world in which branded products become 
increasingly important at the expense of standardised commodities and in which perfect compet-
ition is being replaced by non-competitive market structures, the share of firms that are subject to 
social control may actually be increasing 
5   Models in which the population shares are endogenous have been analysed by Schelling (1978), 
Naylor (1990), Myles/Naylor (1996), Lai/Yang/Chang (2003) and Nyborg/Rege (2003). The main 
difference between their models and the present one is that they look at a dichotomous decision 
whether or not to contribute to a public good and that the shares of contributors and non-contrib-
utors are variable. This paper in contrast assumes that the shares of the two types of individuals in 




·  A>0, T=0:  command and control, 
·  A>0, T=c'(A):  emission taxes, tradable permits, or abatement subsidies, 
·  A>0, T<c'(A):  a combination of command and control with small effluent   
fees or abatement subsidies which are not binding.  
The fourth category is rather uncommon and this type of environmental regulation is 
introduced for analytical reasons, which will become obvious later. To simplify not-
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Thus, D = 1 denotes the case of market instruments in environmental policy and  
D = 0 stands for command and control where effluent charges may exist, but are 
merely symbolic and do not influence the behaviour of the C-sector of the economy. 
  Voluntary  emission  reductions are socially rewarded. In return to her effort to 
reduce  emissions  below  the  level  required  by  the  environmental  regulation,  the 
individual earns a social reward, which generates some positive utility. The social 
reward  accruing  to  a  single  individual  depends  positively  on  her  own  abatement 
effort and negatively on the abatement efforts of the rest of society. The idea behind 
this is that social rewards – and social norms– are related to what other people do. 
The more abatement other people undertake, the more difficult is it for an individual 
to earn social recognition. Define 
  a* = za + (1–z)A  (2) 
as the average abatement level. Then the social-rewards function is defined as s(a,a*) 
with sa(a,a*) > 0, sa*(a,a*) < 0, subscripts denoting partial derivatives. sa(a,a*) > 0 
indicates  that  more  abatement  effort  is  always  socially  rewarded.  I  neglect  the 
possibility that too much effort might be considered to be foolish and might possibly 
not be acknowledged. sa*(a,a*) < 0 represents the fact that a high level of individual 
abatement is less admirable if everyone abates a lot than if the average abatement is 
low.  Note  that  an  externality  is  involved  here.  By  increasing  her  own  abatement 
effort, an individual contributes to an increase in the average abatement level and 
thus to a reduction in social rewards. Social norms are driven by individual behaviour 
and each individual engaging in effort to fulfill the social norm drives the standard 
up. As regards second derivatives of s(a,a*), assume that s is concave in a: saa  < 0, 
arguments of the function omitted for convenience. Moreover, as a normalisation I 
use  s(a*,a*)  =  0,  i.e.  average  behaviour  does  not  induce  positive  social  rewards  
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irrespective of the amount of abatement. As regards the cross derivative, one might 
conjecture  that  the  marginal  social  reward  of  an  individual  is  decreasing  in  the 
abatement  acitivities  of  the  rest  of  society,  but  it  is  easy  to  construct  sensible 
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s   (3b) 
with h > 0 and e > 0. For h = 0 and e = 0, these formulae simplify to specifications 
where  social  recognition  is  set  equal  to  absolute  and  relative  deviations  of  the 
individual  from  the  avarage,  respectively.  With  specification  (3a),  * aa s   is  always 
zero. With (3b), saa* < 0 if e < 1 and saa*  > 0 if e > 1. In the first case, increased 
abatement by others reduces the productivity of own abatement in the generation of 
social rewards and thus discourages abatement. In the second case, more abatement 
by others encourages more abatement by the individual under consideration. Thus, 
the sign of saa* is indeterminate. Holländer (1990) starts from a linear specification of 
the social-rewards function and employs arguments of social consistency based on 
individual  willingness  to  contribute  to  social  rewards  to  endogenously  determine 
parameters of the function. This supply of social rewards depends on the marginal 
rate of substitution between public and private goods. Using this to parameterise the 
linear social-rewards function, Holländer ends up with a function that is in fact non-
linear. In contrast, I use a more general social-rewards function to start with but do 
not raise the question of supply of social rewards.  
  Indvidual well-being depends on abatement cost, tax payments, utility from social 
rewards, and on the disutility from pollution. The utility generated by social rewards 
is u(s), u(.) having the normal properties: positive and decreasing marginal utility,  
u' > 0, u'' < 0. Moreover, environmental pollution, P, is the the sum of all individual 
emissions and it is taken as given by each individual.  
  P = E – a* = E – za – (1-z) A,  (4)  
where total emissions equal average emissions since the population size has been 
normalised to unity. Let environmental damage be a strictly convex function d(P) of 
pollution, i.e. d'(.)>0 and d''(.)>0. The total utility of a socially responsive individual 
then is 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ) ( * * , ) ( a E t a E d a a s u a c wS - × - - - + - =   (5)  
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where t is the emission tax rate paid by type-S individuals. It should be noted that an 
abatement  subsidy  instead  of  an  emission  tax  would  not  change the results. Just 
interpret +ta as the abatement subsidy and –tE as a lump-sum tax, which is neutral. 
Thus all results to be derived in the remainder of the paper carry over from emission 
taxes to abatement subsidies.   
For most of the remainder of the paper, I assume that both groups of society are 
subject to the same environmental regulation.   
Assumption 1: t = T. 
Only in Section 4.3 will this assumption be relaxed and I will consider the possibility 
of discriminating environmental regulation. The motivation behind Assumption 1 is 
that is in practice difficult, if not possible, to distinguish the two types. If they could 
be  distinguished  and  if  differentiated  environmental  policies  could  be  applied,  it 
would be questionable whether social rewards would still depend on the average 
level of abatement in society or rather on the group-specific abatement requirement 
applicable to type-S individuals.  
 
3.   The  Effect  of  Environmental  Policy  on  Voluntary  Abatement 
and on the Environment 
3.1  Optimal Voluntary Abatement 
The  optimal  abatement  level  a  representative  type-S  individual  is  determined  by 
differentiation of (5) subject to a > A with respect to a. The first-order condition is 
  , 0 *) , ( ) ( ' ) ( ' £ + + - t a a s s u a c a   (6) 
where  the  left-hand  side  is  negative  if  the  constraint  is  binding.  From  (6),  the 
following result can be inferred.  
Proposition 1. In the case of market instruments of environmental policy 
(D=1), there will always be voluntary abatement: a>A. In the case of pure 
command  and  control  without  any  taxes  (t=T=0),  a>A  only  if 
) ( ' ) , ( ) 0 ( ' A c A A s u a > . 
Proof. Assume a=A. Then condition (6) reads  ) ( ' ) , ( ) 0 ( ' A c t A A s u a £ + . 
If D=1, c'(A)=T=t and condition (6) is violated. Thus, a=A cannot be 
true. If t=0, condition (6) turns out to be  ) ( ' ) , ( ) 0 ( ' A c A A s u a £ . If this 
condition is violated, a=A must be wrong. Then, a>A.   
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The intuition behind this proposition is rather straightforward. In the case of emission 
taxes, all individuals try to avoid the emission tax by abating at least A irrespective of 
whether they respond to social recognition. The demand for social recognition gener-
ates incentives to increase abatement beyond this level. Under command and control, 
there is no cost of not abating that can be avoided. If the marginal utility from social 
recognition  is  less  than  the  marginal  abatement  cost,  even  socially  responsive 
individuals will not abate more than the required minimum. This is closely related to 
a point made by Diekmann and Preisendörfer (2003). They distinguish between low-
cost  and  high-cost  situations.  If  environmentally  concerned  individuals  face  low 
(marginal)  costs  of  environmentally  friendly  behaviour,  they  will  behave  in  an 
environmentally  friendly  way.  If  the  costs  are  high,  they  will  behave  like  their 
environmentally unconcerned fellow citizens and choose just the minimum action 
required. Proposition 1 shows that this argument carries over from intrinsic motiv-
ation to the extrinsic motivation to earn social recognition. If marginal abatement 
costs  are  high,  socially  responsive  people  neglect  social  rewards  and  just  do  the 
required minimum. 
  In the remainder of the paper, I wish to confine myself to situations with voluntary 
abatement and social rewards and therefore I assume that the marginal benefits from 
social rewards always at least outweigh the marginal cost of obtaining them: 
Assumption 2:  ) ( ' ) , ( ) 0 ( ' A c A A s u a > . 
With boundary solutions ruled out, the optimality condition is 
  t a a s s u a c a = - *) , ( ) ( ' ) ( ' .  (6') 
In the case of an emission tax, the marginal cost of abatement equals the tax rate plus 
the  marginal  utility  of  social  rewards.  Otherwise,  the  marginal  cost  equals  the 
marginal utility. The second-order condition is satisfied.  
 
3.2 Environmental Policy and Voluntary Abatement 
If we want to identify the impact of environmental policy measures on voluntary 
abatement, two variables are of interest. The first one is the strictness of environ-
mental  regulation  measured  by  A.  The  second  one  is  the  type  of  environmental 
regulation: what is the consequence of a move from command and control to market-
oriented environmental policies? This will be analysed by varying the tax rate t such 
that the behaviour of the S sector is not affected, i.e. we look at an effluent charge  
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which is so small that it does not affect abatement by the C sector of the economy:   
t = T < c'(A).  
  Total differentiation of equation (6') gives the desired results. It has to be taken 
into account now that in equilibrium a* = za + (1–z)A. Moreover, in the case of a 
market approach in environmental policy, the change in the tax rate accompanying 
the change in abatement A is dT = c''(A)dA. Thus, 
 
( ) ( ) * * ' " ) ( "
1
aa aa a a a zs s u zs s s u a c dt
da
+ - + -
=      if  t = T <c' (A)  (7) 
and 
  ( )( )
( ) ( ) * *
* *
' " ) ( "
' " 1 ) ( "
aa aa a a a
aa a a
zs s u zs s s u a c
s u s s u z A Dc
dA
da
+ - + -
+ - +














The denominators on the right-hand sides of equations (7) and (8) are identical and 
are likely to be positive. There are two terms that may exhibit the "wrong" negative 
signs:  * ' aa s zu -  and  * " a as s zu - . To illustrate what a negative denominator means, let 
us look at a change in the tax rate like the one in equation (7). If the tax rate is 
increased,  an  individual  takes  a*  as  given  and  increases  abatement  since  total 
marginal cost (TMC), i.e. marginal abatement cost minus marginal utility, seems to 








a1  a0  a'1 
Figure 1: Effects of an increase in the emission tax  
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curve. Ex post, however, since other individuals behave in the same way, a* does 
change  and  this  is  taken  into  account  in  the  denominator  of  (7).  A  negative 
denominator means that the "true TMC" curve, originating if all type-S individuals 
do the same thing, is negatively sloped and the equilibrium is at an abatement level 
a1. The incentives faced by the individual under consideration, however, make her 
choose a'1, which is too large. All individuls do this and, thus, the true TMC is re-
vealed and the perceived TMC curve is shifted downwards. This is an incentive to 
further raise the abatement level and it is obvious that the new equilibrium is unstable 
and that a1 will never be reached. Let us, therefore, assume that the denominator is 
positive. In particular, we make 
Assumption 3:  0 * ³ + a a zs s  and  0 * £ + aa aa zs s . 
Remark. The first part of Assumption 3 is satisfied for the additive specification, 
(3a), if h < 1 and for the multiplicative specification, (3b), for all values of e. The 
second condition is satisfied for both specifications for all admissible parameter 
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Table 1: Assumption 3 in Cases of Specifications (3a) and (3b) 
 
 
With this assumption, the following result follows from condition (7): 
Proposition 2. A marginal increase in the emission tax that has no effect 
on type-C individuals raises the abatement by type-S individuals. 
Proof. With assumption 3, the denominator in (7) is unambiguously posi-
tive.   
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The underlying intuition is that the tax increase raises the opportunity cost of dis-
charging pollutants. There is no crowding-out effect in the sense that socially valu-
able behaviour is devalued if a price is attached to it. It may be true that regulations 
introducing  pecuniary  incentives  for  activities  that  have  been  subject  to  non-
pecuniary rewards before, destroy moral and social values, but not in this model.
6  
From the other equation, (8), the following result follows immediately: 
Proposition 3. A stricter environmental policy has ambiguous effects on 
abatement by type-S individuals. Under emission taxes, the same increase 
in abatement requirements for type C induces more abatement by type S 
than under command and control. 
Proof. If Assumption 3 holds, the denominator in (8) is unambiguously 
positive.  The  numerator  contains  two  positive  terms,  Dc"(A)  and  
(1-z)u"sasa* , and one that is possibly negative, (1-z)u'saa* . Thus, the sign 
of the numerator is ambiguous. Since, c"(A)>0, a change from D=0 to 
D=1 increases da/dA. 
The three effects in the numerator can be explained as follows. c"(A) is the increase 
in the emission tax necessary to induce more abatement by type C. To type S, this 
change in the tax raises the real cost of polluting and induces more abatement, too. 
(1-z)u"sasa*  states that an increase in A reduces average abatement, a*, which reduces 
the marginal social reward from abatement and this in turn raises the marginal utility 
from  social  rewards.  Thus,  there  is  an  additional  incentive  to  abate.  In  contrast,  
(1-z)u'saa*  represents a discouragement effect if saa*.<0. Then increased abatement by 
others  reduces  the  marginal  productivity  of  own  abatement  in  generating  social 
rewards.  The  result  that  taxes  generate  more  abatement  by  type-S  individuals  is 












+ = ,  (9) 
where da/dt is given by equation (7) and CAC stands for "command and control". 
                                                            
6   Experimental  evidence  showing  that  this  kind  of  crowding-out  is  relevant  in  some  real-world 
situations is provided by Gneezy/Rustichini (2000a,b). Lai/Yang/Chang (2003) in their theoretical 
model assume that an individual's propensity to react to social norms depends on the tax rate. 
Albeit a bit ad hoc, such an assumption can generate a large variety of behaviours. The approach 
suggested by Bénabou/Tirole (2006), who argue that individuals reacting to pecuniary incentives 
face the problem of being regarded by others as greedy, however, seems to be more satisfactory.  
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  The next question to be addressed here is that of crowding out of voluntary abate-
ment by decreed abatement. Define voluntary abatement as a–A. Then  
   ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) * *
* *
' " ) ( "
' " ) ( " ) ( "
1
aa aa a a a
aa aa a a a
zs s u zs s s u a c





+ - + -
+ + + + -
= - =
-    (10) 
Inspection of (10) gives 
Proposition  4.  The  impact  of  environmental  regulation  on  voluntary 
emission reduction is ambiguous.  
Proof. There are several positive and negative terms in the numerator and 
it is not clear which terms dominate. 
Crowding out of socially rewarded behaviour is likely. Voluntary abatement may be 
increased if 
·  c"(A) is very large compared to c"(a). In this case, the tax increase necessary to 
induce  the  increase  in  A  is  large  whereas  the  increase  in  marginal  cost  of 
additional abatement by type-S persons is small. 
·  sa* is large in absolute value. Then abatement by others reduces social rewards 
substantially and this raises the marginal utility from social rewards. 
·  saa* is positive and large. Then, increased abatement efforts by others raise the 
social recognition gained by own abatement efforts of individuals of type S. 
 
3.3 Environmental Regulation and Environmental Quality 
Let us now consider the effects of environmental regulation on pollution. Since type-
S individuals may be induced by stricter environmental standards to increase their 
emissions, it is by no means clear that such a stricter environmental regulation is 
good for the environment. From equations (2) and (8), we have  
  ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) * *
2
' " ) ( "
' " 1 ) ( " 1 ) ( "
1
*
aa aa a a a
aa a
zs s u zs s s u a c






+ - + -
+ - - - +
= + - =    (11) 
and this implies: 
Proposition 5. Stricter environmental regulation reduces environmental 
pollution. 
Proof. Assumption 3 guarantees a positive denominator in (11). All terms 
in the numerator are unambiguously positive.   
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Although type-S individuals may be induced to increase their emissions, the overall 
effect is an emission reduction. The reason is that the effect that might induce type-S 
persons to raise their emissions depends negatively on the share of type-S individ-
uals, z. See equation (8). Thus, the stronger the effect, the smaller is the number of 
exhibiting this behaviour. Of course, if it were possible that the share of socially 
responsive individuals, z, could change as a consequence of tighter environmental 
standards  like  in  Lai/Yang/Chang  (2003),  a  worsening  of  environmental  quality 
would become feasible.  
 
4. Welfare Effects and Optimal Environmental Policies 
4.1 Welfare and the Pigouvian Tax 
In a society where environmentally responsible behaviour is driven by social norms, 
there is more than one externality. Not only does the individual neglect her impact on 
environmental pollution; she also does not consider that her own abatement activities 
have  an  impact  on  the  social  rewards  that  other  people  receive.  It  is,  therefore, 
unlikely  that  the  standard  policy  implication  of  environmental  economics,  the 
Pigouvian tax rule, applies here. The Pigouvian tax equalises marginal damage and 
marginal cost of abatement for the type-C part of society: 
  ( ) * ' ) ( ' a E d A c T - = =         (12) 
  All individuals being treated equally, social welfare, W, is the unweighted sum of 
all  individual  utilities.  It  is  assumed  that  tax  revenues  are  re-injected  into  the 
economy in a lump-sum fashion. Thus, the tax payment and the public expenditure 
cancel out when social welfare is calculated. 
  ( ) ( ) * *) , ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( a E d a a s zu A c z a zc W - - + - - - =   (13) 
W  is  not  necessarily  concave  in  the  policy  instrument,  A.  For  instance,  da/dA 
(equation (8)) contains several second derivatives implying that dW/dA contains these 
derivatives as well and that d
2W/dA
2 then contains third derivatives. Thus, I make the 
following assumption such that the second-order condition is satisfied. 
Assumption 3: d
2W/dA
2 < 0. 
Is the Pigouvian tax optimal in this model and, if not, is it is too large or too small? 
Differentiation of (12) with respect to A yields: 
  ( ) ( )
dA
da











 + - =     
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with  da/dA  being  determined  by  equation  (8).  Using  the  S  sector's  first-order 
condition, equation (6'), yields 
  ( )
dA
da











 + - = ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' ' 1 * ,  (14) 
Inserting the Pigouvian tax rule, (12), into (14) and using T=t=c'(A), yields  
  *














 + - =
=
       (15)  
and this shows that a Pigouvian environmental tax is not optimal since it does not 
internalise the effect of changing social rewards on welfare.   
Proposition 6. Pigouvian taxation as defined by (13) is too strict. 
Proof. The term in brackets on the right-hand side is da*/dA, which is 
positive (Proposition 5), and sa* is negative. Thus, an increase in C-sector 
abatement A, has a negative effect on welfare and this implies that the 
welfare maximum is located at a lower abatement level.  
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is that tighter environmental standards reduce 
social  rewards.  This  implies  that  environmental  regulation  should  be  relaxed 
compared to a situation where only the environment, but not social norms, matter. 
 
4.2 Optimal Environmental Regulation with One Instrument 
Given that the Pigouvian tax does not satisfy the first-order condition of optimality, a 
better environmental policy is sought. Setting dW/dA=0 in equation (14) gives 























1 ) ( ' *   (16) 
If the policy instrument is a tax, t=T=c'(A) and it follows that 
  * ' ' ) ( ' a s zu d A c T + = =         (for   D = 1).    (17a) 
In the case of command and control with t=T=0, 
  ( ) * ' '
1












+ =     (for   t=T=D=0).  (17b) 
From (17a) and (17b), one can conclude 
Proposition 7. Assume a non-discriminating environmental policy. If the 
instrument is a tax, the optimal tax rate is less than marginal environ-
mental damage. In the case of pure command and control, the shadow  
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price of emissions is positive and may be larger or less than the environ-
mental damage and larger or less than the optimal tax rate . 
Proof. In equation (17a), the second term on the right-hand side is un-
ambiguously negative. In equation (17b), the first term in brackets is pos-
itive due to condition (11). Using (11) and D=0, (17b) can be rewritten:   
           ( )




' " ) ( "
' " ) ( "
) ( ' a
aa aa a a a
aa a s zu d
zs s u zs s s u a c
s u s u a c
A c +
+ - + -
+ -
=  
If saa* > 0, the fraction on the left-hand side is larger than 1 and the 
implicit price of emisions is larger than the tax rate defined in (17a) and 
may be larger than the environmental damage. If saa* < 0, the fraction can 
be less than 1 and the shadow price can be less than the tax rate.  
The  difference  between  environmental  taxation  and  the  command-and-control 
approch is that command and control does not provide incentives that influence the 
behaviour of type-S individuals directly. Thus, the levels of optimal environmental 
regulation depend on the instruments used. One may now ask which approach to 
environmental policy is better under the given circumstances. An answer will be 
given in the next section, where two policy instruments are considered. 
 
4.3 Optimal Environmental Regulation with Two Instruments 
Given that there are two externalities in this model, one being related to the environ-
mental problem and the other one to social norms, two policy instruments might be 
better than one. There are two possibilities of dealing with this. On the one hand, one 
could  discriminate  between  type-S  and  type-C  individuals  and  implement  group-
specific rules. Assume for a moment that this is possible. On the other hand, one can 
design a single environmental policy consisting of two instruments that affect the two 
groups in different ways. In this case, we would look at the combination of a tight 
emission standard with a low emission tax, such that the emission tax is of mere 
symbolic nature to the C sector, but affects the behaviour of type-C individuals.  
In what follows, I determine an optimal tax rate for type-S individuals that can be 
combined with an optimal (command-and-control or tax) regulation of the C sector. 
The problem is to maximise social welfare, (13), with respect to the tax rate t. Thus, 
the first-order condition is 
  ( ) ( ) 0 ' ) ( ' ' * = + + - =
dt
da
zs s u a c d z
dt
dW
a a    
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with  da/dt  being  determined  by  equation  (7).  Using  the  S  sector's  first-order 
condition, equation (6'), yields 
  * ' ' a s zu d t + = .               (18) 
This is the same condition as that for the taxation of the C sector, equation (17a). 
From this and from using (18) in (16), we have 
Proposition  8.  If  two  policy  instruments  can  be  chosen,  the  optimal 
policy is characterised by 
        * ' ' a s zu d T t + = =             
and  a  discrimination  between  type-C  and  type-S  individuals  is  not 
required.  
Proof. The optimal regulation of the C sector for any given S-specific tax 
rate t is determined by (16). Using (18) in (16) implies  * ' ' ) ( ' a s zu d A c + =  
This can be implemented by the tax rate derived in (18) because T=c'(A).  
In other words, the two policy instruments collapse into one. There is no reason to 
discriminate between the S and the C sectors of the economy. The rationale is that 
both  sectors  generate  the  same  externalities:  an  environmental  externality  and  a 
second externality via the impact of abatement on the social rewards accruing to the 
type-S people. In both sectors, C and S, the mechanism generating this latter extern-
ality is the same. There is increase in the average abatement effort, which is the 
bechmark against which individual effort is measured. Matters would be different if 
there were a direct negative effect of regulation of the C sector on social rewards 
accruing  to  the  S  sector.  With  such  a  negative  externality  of  C  abatement,  the 
regulation of the C sector should be relaxed compared to that of the S sector.  
  From  the  way  in  which  Proposition  8  has  been  derived,  one  can  draw  an 
additional conclusion. 
Proposition 9. An optimal emission tax is better than optimal command 
and control. 
Proof. For any tax rate (including zero) for the S sector, (16) determines 
the optimal regulation of the C sector. Gradually introducing a tax for the 
S sector, we ultimately arrive at an optimum and the optimal tax rate 
equals the tax rate that would induce the C sector to choose the same 
abatement level as under command and control.  
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This is a notable deviation from the standard result of environmental economics in a 
competitive  world,  where  flexible  instruments  and  command  and  control  are 
equivalent. In the present model, the impact of command and control on the S sector 
would only be indirect, via the change in social rewards induced by the change in 
general abatement requirements. An instrument that directly influences the behaviour 
of type-S individuals is a tax. Since the two sectors generate the same externalities, 
both environmentally and via social norms, the optimal tax rate is the same.  
 
5. Majority Voting 
The  previous  section  has  assumed  a  benevolent  utilitarian  dictator  maximising  a 
social-welfare function in which all individuals have equal weights. We now look at 
majority voting. Either z < ½ and type-C individuals dominate the decision about 
environmental  policy  or  z  >  ½  and  type-S  individuals  decide.  Assume  that  only 
environmental policy is on the agenda and that concerns about the distribution of the 
emission tax revenue are not considered. Otherwise, the dominating group would 
have  a  tax-revenue  motive  and  would  try  to  exploit  the  other  group  via  the  tax 
system.  In  the  economic  analysis,  marginal-tax-revenue  rules  and  Laffer-curve 
arguments would turn up. To rule out these effects, assume that tax revenues are 
recycled as lump-sum transfers to the group paying the taxes. Moreover, I assume 
that there is only one policy instrument, equally applied to both groups in society. 
Let  us  first  consider  majority  voting  by  type-C  individuals.  Their  objective 
function is  
  ( ) * ) ( a E d A c W
C - - - =         (19) 
and the first-order condition is 
  ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' d
dA
da





 + - =         (20) 
From (20), we have 
Proposition 10. The optimal tax from the point of view of the C sector is 
larger (less) than the Pigouvian tax if if tighter standards lead to more 
(less) voluntary abatement of the S sector. 
Proof.  Note  that  more  (less)  voluntary  abatement  is  equivalent  to 
da/dA>(<)1. Then compare (20) to the Pigouvian tax rule, c'(A)=d'.   
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It  is not surprising that the C sector does not consider social-norms externalities 
because it is not affected by them. A positive impact of environmental regulation on 
voluntary  abatement  of  the  S  sector  strengthens  the  environmental  efficiency  of 
environmental regulation. If the marginal damage that can be avoided by an increase 
in abatement is large, then the optimal abatement effort is large.  
Finally the issue of instrument choice shall be discussed. Does the C sector prefer 
taxes or command and control? The impact of a move from command and control 








' =  > 0,        (21) 
and this directly implies 
Proposition 11. The C sector prefers taxes to command and control. 
The  underlying  reason  is  that  taxes  induce  the  S  sector  to  do  more  for  the 
environment without any cost to be borne by the C sector. 
Let us now consider majority voting by type-S individuals. The objective function 
is 
  ( ) ( ) * *) , ( ) ( a E d a a s u a c W
S - - + - =         (22) 
and the first-order condition turns out to be 






s u a c a a
*
' ' ' ) ( ' * + = - ,         
where  da/dA  and  da*/dA  are  determined  by  equations  (8)  and  (11), respectively. 
Using the first-order condition, (6') to substitute for c'(a) – u'sa, we have,  








' ' * + = ,        (23)  
where t=c'(A) in the case of emission taxes and t=0 under command and control. 
Thus,  
  0 ' ' * = + a s u d     under command and control,  (24a) 
  ) ( '
/ *
/
' ' * A c
dA da
dA da
s u d a = +     under emission taxes.  (24b) 
Interestingly, the optimal environmental regulation from the point of view of the S 
sector  is  independent  of  this  sector's  marginal  abatement  cost  (although  second 
derivatives are contained in da/dA and da*/dA). The optimal command-and-control 
regulation  should  be  designed  such  that  the  two  externalities  generated  by  the S  
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sector just cancel out at the margin. In the case of an emission tax, a wedge arises 
since the tax is a real cost to the individual agent, whereas it is not for the voter, who 
knows the rule of reimbursement. Thus, the intuition is that command and control is 
better  than  taxes  and  the  following  considerations  confirm  this  conjecture. 
Differentiation of W
S with respect to t, noting that A is constant for small tax rates 
and that, therefore, da*/dt = z da/dt  yields 
  ( ) ( )
dt
da





) ( ' ' ' ' * - + + = . 
















 - = 1
/ *
/
.        (25) 
This implies 
Proposition 12. The C sector prefers command and control to taxes. The 
optimal tax rate is zero. 












= - .  Thus,  if  an  existing  tax  rate  is  positive 
(negative), it welfare-improving to reduce (increase) it.  
The  underlying  rationale  is  that  an  optimal  regulation  just  equates  the  two 
externalities (equation (24a)) and that taxation induces a wedge between the decision 
rules for the individual and for the sector as a whole.  
  This section has shown, that the C and the S sectors have different perceptions 
on  what  constitutes  a  good  environmental  policy.  Type-C  individuals  like  taxes 
whereas type-S individuals prefer command and control. In both cases the reason is 
that taxes shift the burden of cleaning up the environment from the C sector to the S 
sector. It should be noted that this results has been obtained under the assumption 
that tax revenues are re-distributed such that each tax payer exactly gets back what 
she has paid, i.e. considerations about the redistribution of tax revenues have been 
excluded by assumption.  
 
6. Final Remarks 
This paper has shown that social norms and environmental regulation interact in a 
way  that  gives  rise  to  interesting  policy  implications.  In  particular,  I  find  that  
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command and control and flexible instruments generate different effects even though 
individuals are price takers in this model. Optimal environmental policies differ from 
the standard Pigouvian policies since social norms generate additional externalities 
that an optimal policy should take into account. In this context it is shown that taxes 
are  better  than  standards.  However,  when  it  comes  to  political  decision  making, 
status-responsive  individuals  would  vote  against  such  a  policy  and  in  favour  of 
command and control. 
Unlike  in  some  other  models,  the  introduction  of  taxes  does  not  crowd  out 
voluntary abatement. On the contrary, it provides incentives to increase abatement. 
There exists the theoretical possibility, however, that the converse happens, but the 
resulting equilibrium is unstable and this has been excluded by Assumption 2. 
Some caveats are indicated. Firstly, I have treated the supply of social rewards 
(or social sanctions) as exogenous to the model. In other models this supply is related 
to the share of people exhibiting prosocial behaviour. In the present model, this share 
is  constant,  which  makes  sense  if  we  think of a C sector subject to competitive 
pressure and an S sector that responds to social rewards. Secondly, besides the un-
stable-equilibrium case, there is nothing in this model generating the effect that the 
mere  introduction  of  a  price  crowds  out  social  norms.  As  Gneezy/Rustichini 
(2000a,b) have shown, however, this crwoding out can be relevant in some real-
world situations. The approach taken by Lai/Yang/Chang (2003), who assume that 
the propensity to react to social sanctions or rewards is related to the price incentive, 
is  not  particularly  satisfactory.  The  more  recent  paper  by  Bénabou/Tirole  (2006) 
shows how this can be modelled more convincingly in a signalling framework and I 
expect future research in the field to go into this direction. I conjecture that my result 
of the superiority of taxes over command and control will be challenged by such 
models, but other results of this paper, in particular those related to social-status 
externalities and imperfection of Pigouvian taxes will carry over to more complex 
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